China and the Transatlantic Relationship after the US Elections

The exact course the US will take with regard to China depends on the election results. China itself sees differences but mostly similarities between Donald Trump and Kamala Harris. Beijing is preparing for further intensification of the geopolitical competition with the US in any case. This will also have consequences for Europe and the transatlantic relationship.

Chinese international relations experts expect that the presidential policies of both candidates on China will be largely the same. Indeed, the main components of the current US strategy on China will likely be reflected in the policies of both Trump and Harris. These include continuing the trade war, increasing restrictions on technological, financial and economic exchanges with China, and pressuring America's partner countries to also reduce certain contacts with China. These processes were initiated, or greatly intensified, around 2018, when Donald Trump was president. His successor Joe Biden continued them, and the next president is likely to also continue along these lines.

Still, it will make a difference to China who will succeed Biden. A major difference for China between the two presidential candidates is that the US under Harris will probably be more subtle, and therefore more effective, in its communication with partner countries in coordinating on strategic issues than under Trump. This applies not only to, for example, the sale of high-tech products such as chips and chip machines to China, but also to the mutual cooperation between the US and its military allies and partners.

Not attractive

Trump may, as he has done before , pressure US allies and partners in Asia to pay more for the US military presence in the region. Implicit in that approach is the threat that the US could withdraw some of its troops, which could undermine confidence in America as a protector. Biden has had more success in assuring China's neighbours that they can continue to count on the US by emphasizing that it is in the US interest to protect them from China. The same will likely be true for Harris if she succeeds Biden as president. Harris is also seen in China as ideologically driven, at least compared to the pragmatic Trump, and thus someone who is likely to be very critical of China when it comes to human rights. In other words, there are several ways in which Harris would be more problematic for China as president than Trump .

But the prospect of a renewed presidency of Donald Trump is also not attractive to China. For example, he has announced that he wants to significantly increase import tariffs on Chinese products. That would hit Chinese exports because the US is still an important sales market for China. Furthermore, Trump has shown during his first term that he is unpredictable and may be prepared to use the Taiwan issue to pressure China to force trade concessions. If Trump were to change US Taiwan policy, that could lead to major destabilization of the relationship between China and the US. In addition, if Trump becomes president again, he will probably be surrounded by advisors who are fiercely anti-Chinese even more than during his first term.

Relative stability

However, the US presidential election is important for China not only because of the differences between the two candidates, but also because it could mark the end of a period of relative stability. The November 2023 meeting between Biden and Xi in San Francisco laid the foundation for mutual understanding for the near future. Given the troubled state of the Chinese economy and the upcoming US presidential election, both sides had an incentive to avoid further escalation of tensions. This was of direct significance in connection with the elections in Taiwan in January 2024, which could easily have led to new tensions. But the US and China managed to avoid this, even when the Chinese military conducted exercises around the island last May. China did this in response to the speech by the new Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te delivered his speech at his inauguration on May 20, 2024. According to the Chinese government, Lai 's speech was highly provocative because it seemed to suggest that as far as he was concerned, Taiwan and China were separate countries.

An explicit declaration of independence would be unacceptable to China and would likely have led to armed intervention. There have also been several incidents in the South China Sea in recent months, in which the Philippines and China came into conflict with each other. Despite the tense situation in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, China and the US have continued to maintain contact at a high political level. At the end of August, the US National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan, visited Beijing. It is possible that after the US elections, the more volatile situation of before late 2023 will return. After all, the underlying problems in the Sino-American relationship are still very much present. On the other hand, the US has its hands full with the ongoing conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, and the prospects for China's economy continue to be uncertain. Both the US and China therefore have an interest in keeping their mutual tensions limited, at least in the short term.

Consequences for Europe

While it is unknown exactly how US-China relations will proceed after the November 5, 2024 election, the trend appears clear. Relations with the US have been deteriorating over the past decades, and it is quite possible that this process will continue for years or even decades to come. The way in which the Chinese government is preparing for the post-election period does not differ significantly from the policy it has been pursuing for some time.

An essential part of this is preventing the country from becoming internationally isolated.

The US, thanks in part to its many allies, is more capable than any other country of building international coalitions to put pressure on its rivals. This pressure can be military or economic in nature. China therefore tries to maintain good relations with as many countries as possible, both bilaterally and within international organisations. In addition, the Chinese government wants to secure economic and technological relations with specific countries. China needs these relations to allow its economy to function smoothly and to stand strong against external threats through military modernisation. The US is giving China less and less access to its economy and technology. That is why relations with other economically highly developed countries, especially countries in East Asia and Western Europe, are becoming increasingly important to China.

All this has major consequences for Europe. First, China is increasingly turning to Russia as its most important strategic partner. As long as cooperation with Russia continues, China will not be isolated in the UN Security Council, it will have a militarily strong partner, and China cannot be physically surrounded by American military bases and countries with which it has a difficult relationship. The US has a military presence in Japan and South Korea, and to a lesser extent in the Philippines. China has border disputes with India and Vietnam. Then there is Taiwan, which cooperates closely with the US on security matters. As long as the Chinese government expects tensions with the US to increase, chances that Beijing will do anything that could seriously damage Chinese relations with Russia are low. This means that China's lack of cooperation will continue to undermine Western attempts to isolate Russia, or to pressure it to withdraw from Ukraine through sanctions.

Secondly, China is targeting the EU as the main market for Chinese products and source of technology outside the US. This means that the Chinese government wants Chinese companies to export to or invest in the EU, and therefore wants to maintain good relations with the EU and its member states. The Chinese government's attitude towards Europe is therefore less negative and critical than towards the US. The Chinese leaders also hope that this will prevent the EU and the US from working together even more closely against China.

The European-Chinese relationship has become increasingly difficult in recent years. But despite this, China seems to be striving to limit further decline and at least prevent the relationship from becoming as bad as the one with the US. This gives the EU more room to ask for certain (limited) concessions from China, for example in the areas of trade and investment. At the same time, this does not give the EU the opportunity to get China to put pressure on Russia to end the war in Ukraine. China needs Russia too much for that, even if the American pressure on China were not to increase any further.

Transatlantic Coordination

For the EU, cooperation with the US on geopolitical issues is essential, including with regard to China. Without such cooperation, Europe is much weaker bilaterally vis-à-vis China. The US also plays an essential role as a counterweight to potential Chinese hegemony at the global level. A world dominated by China will probably not be beneficial to the EU's core interests. Moreover, the EU is more dependent on the US than the other way around, and the US government expects its partners and allies to support its China strategy in broad terms. No or limited cooperation with the US on China would damage the transatlantic relationship.

At the same time, European and US interests are not identical. Russia is a greater threat to the EU than it is to the US. China is more important to Europe as an economic partner than it is to America, which itself is still the world's largest economy. The EU has a major interest in preventing US attempts to isolate China technologically and economically from going so far that China would cooperate far more closely with Russia in the military field than it has been doing. The EU also cannot afford to become cut off from China technologically and economically, because that would severely weaken Europe's innovative strength and international competitiveness. The more China needs the EU, the more Europe's ability to negotiate from a position of strength will grow.

Whoever becomes the new US president is unlikely to change much of the importance that China currently attaches to strategic cooperation with Russia and to maintaining economic and technological ties with the EU. However, the EU can only respond effectively to changes in the Chinese position if there is a solid basis for cooperation with the US. Otherwise, there is a risk that tensions will arise between the transatlantic partners, or that China will be given the opportunity to play them off against each other. The need for Europe to conduct policy towards China on issues that affect US strategic interests is likely to continue to grow in the coming years. The US and the EU may often see eye to eye on China, but inevitably they will sometimes have different interests and perspectives.

The existing basis of US-European cooperation dates back to a time when both sides shared a common view of which region of the world had the greatest strategic importance (namely Europe) and which actor posed the greatest threat (namely the Soviet Union). For Europe, little has changed in these respects, but the US now sees Asia as the most important region, and China as the greatest threat. To ensure that the transatlantic relationship is robust enough for continued cooperation on China, the EU and the United States must agree on a number of fundamental issues. The most important of these is China's geopolitical position in East Asia.

Central to the US-China rivalry is the balance of power in East Asia. After the end of the Cold War, a bipolar system has emerged there, with China and the US as the two regional leaders. For the US, achieving hegemony in the region is not a realistic aim. However, a feasible geopolitical objective for the US would be to maintain the existing regional balance of power. If the EU and the US adopt the protection of the regional status quo as the main principle for their coordination on China, they would significantly strengthen the basis of their strategic cooperation. This would provide a basis for transatlantic agreement on where certain boundaries lie, not only for European technological and economic cooperation with China, but also for Western pressure on China.

Author: Frans-Paul van der Putten. This is a translated and revised version of an article originally published by Atlantisch Perspectief in October 2024.